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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 003473

SIPDIS

FOR ASD(HD) MCHALE; DASD ROWELL; AND NC/CS REES

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C-039-04

TAGS: [PARM](#)

SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR ASD/HD VISIT TO OTTAWA, CANADA,
11-13 JAN 05 (U)

11. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS A READAHEAD FOR THE 11-13 JANUARY 2005 VISIT TO OTTAWA OF ASST SECDEF (HOMELAND DEFENSE) PAUL MCHALE; DASD SCOTT ROWELL; AND NORTHCOM CHIEF OF STAFF MG FRED REES. RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS AT PARA 8.

12. (C) CANADA-U.S. POL-MIL RELATIONS. PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN LEADS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST MOVE FORWARD CAUTIOUSLY ON POLICY ISSUES AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSITION BEFORE PROCEEDING. PM MARTIN HAS GIVEN STRONG SIGNALS HE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF AND WISHES TO IMPROVE CANUS RELATIONS. SHORTLY AFTER TAKING OFFICE LAST DECEMBER, PM MARTIN ESTABLISHED A NEW CABINET COMMITTEE ON U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS WHICH HE CHAIRS, ESTABLISHED A DHS-LIKE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA) HEADED BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, DEVOTED MORE RESOURCES FOR BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, AND TIGHTER IMMIGRATION SCREENING. IN APRIL, 2004 HE PUBLISHED CANADA'S FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHICH FOCUSES ON:

1A. (U) PROTECTING CANADA AND CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD;

1B. (U) ENSURING CANADA IS NOT A BASE FOR THREATS TO OUR ALLIES;

1C. (U) CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
MARTIN ALSO PUSHED THROUGH THE AMENDMENT TO THE NORAD AGREEMENT, ALLOWING NORAD TO PERFORM THREAT WARNING (INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT) FOR THE MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION. STILL, WHEN POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT DURING THE SPRING 2004 ELECTION SEASON, HIS CAMPAIGN RHETORIC FOCUSED ON DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CANADA AND THE U.S. IN ORDER TO BUILD ROOM BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO SUPPORT MUCH STRONGER TIES TO THE U.S. AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP.

12. (U) PRO-U.S. DEFENSE MINISTER DAVID PRATT LOST HIS PARLIAMENT SEAT IN THE JUNE 2004 ELECTION AND WAS REPLACED BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM GRAHAM, THE OUTGOING FOREIGN MINISTER. GRAHAM MOVED TO DEFENSE WITH A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES FACING CANADA. ONE OF GRAHAM'S STRENGTHS IS THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN IN NATO CIRCLES AND IS VERY COMFORTABLE IN MINISTERIALS AND DEALING WITH NATO ISSUES. HE HAS SPENT THE LAST SIX MONTHS LEARNING THE DEFENSE BUREAUCRACY AND LEADING A DEFENSE REVIEW. HE ALSO SHOWED GOOD JUDGMENT WHEN HE CHOSE SEASONED CANADIAN BUREAUCRAT WARD ELCOCK AS HIS DEPUTY MINISTER (ELCOCK WAS FORMERLY HEAD OF CSIS - CANADIAN CIA EQUIVALENT). GRAHAM HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN ON THE NEED FOR CANADA TO PARTICIPATE IN MISSILE DEFENSE.

13. (U) CANADIAN DEFENSE SPENDING. DUE TO PRESSURE FROM DEFENSE INTEREST GROUPS AND ECHOING CALLS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR PAUL CELLUCCI DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS, A GENERAL RECOGNITION IS SETTLING INTO THE CANADIAN BODY POLITIC THAT DEFENSE HAS BEEN UNDERFUNDED FOR TOO LONG AND MAJOR REINVESTMENTS ARE NEEDED. INCREASED DEFENSE FUNDING HAS EMERGED AS AN OFTEN-DISCUSSED POLITICAL AND EDITORIAL ISSUE. WHILE PM MARTIN HAS ANNOUNCED NEW DEDICATED FUNDING FOR MISSIONS ABROAD AND FUNDED SOME NEW ACQUISITION PROGRAMS, THE CANADIAN DEFENSE BUDGET IS STILL WOEFULLY UNDERFUNDED AND NEAR THE BOTTOM OF NATO MEMBERS IN DEFENSE SPENDING (1.1% GDP).

14. (C) CANADIAN FORCES BACKGROUND. A 20-YEAR LEGACY OF UNDERFUNDING AND REPEATED DEPLOYMENTS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE GENERALLY GUTTED THE CANADIAN FORCES. CAPITAL ACQUISITION ACCOUNTS ARE RAIDED ANNUALLY IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN O&M REQUIREMENTS. BOTH EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ARE STRETCHED. A STRENGTH OF 82,000 IN 1990 HAS ATROPHIED TO SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 50,000, OF WHICH ROUGHLY 19,000 IS DEPLOYABLE. THE RESERVES CANNOT DEPLOY AS UNITS, EVEN DOWN TO THE COMPANY LEVEL, AND ARE PRIMARILY USED AS A LABOR POOL AUGMENTING REGULAR FORCES ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE QUALITY OF CANADIAN FORCES LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL AT ALL RANKS KEEPS THE FORCES GOING. PM MARTIN ANNOUNCED CANADA WOULD ADD 5,000 ACTIVE SOLDIERS AND 3,000 RESERVISTS; HOWEVER, THESE SOLDIERS WOULD BASICALLY JUST ROUND OUT THREE UNDER-MANNED BRIGADES AND THEY WILL TAKE UP TO SIX YEARS TO BE RECRUITED, TRAINED, AND FIELDDED.

15. (C) CURRENT AND PROJECTED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. THE CANADIAN FORCES ARE JUST ENDING A SERIES OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS THAT LEAVES THE FORCES WITH LITTLE CURRENT DEPLOYABLE COMBAT CAPABILITY. MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS (FROM ISAF IV - V LEADERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAITI) TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST 2004, AS THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE ENTERED INTO A ONE YEAR 'OPERATIONAL PAUSE' TO RECONSTITUTE THEIR FORCES. CANADA HAS NUMEROUS OPERATIONS ABROAD, BUT THEY REFER TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF EVEN ONE SOLDIER OR LNO AS AN OPERATION.8 CURRENTLY DEPLOYED FORCES (SPRING 2004 LEVEL; *AIR FORCE DEPLOYMENT):

AFGHANISTAN) 700 (DOWN FROM 2300)
SFOR - 80 (DOWN FROM 650)
HAITI - 100 CIVILIAN RCMP POLICE (VICE 500 SOLDIERS)
GOLAN HEIGHTS (UN OBSERVERS/LOGISTICIAN) - 225 (225)
AFRICA - 20 (20)
ARABIAN GULF/OEF-DEPLOYED WITH GW CSG - 0 (WAS 225)
*ARABIAN GULF C-130 TRANSPORT DETACHMENT - 200 (DOWN FROM 240)

16. (C/NF) CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES CAPABILITIES: WHAT LIES AHEAD. ALL SERVICES OF THE CANADIAN FORCES ARE STRETCHED AND OVER-TASKED, SURVIVING PRIMARILY ON THE QUALITY OF THEIR PEOPLE. INSIDERS INVOLVED WITH DEFENSE ISSUES BELIEVE THAT CANADA IS STILL UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE KINDS OF CHOICES IT MUST MAKE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ITS MILITARY FROM BECOMING IRRELEVANT. WHILE SMALL NUMBERS OF HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES EXIST, SUCH AS JTF-2 TIER-1 SOF COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES (LESS THAN 300 SOLDIERS OF WHICH ABOUT 150 ARE TRIGGER-PULLERS), CANADA IS UNWILLING TO MOVE INTO THE NICHE AREAS WHICH THE BUDGET CAN SUPPORT. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CANADIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN AROUND 50,000 - CERTAINLY NOT EXCEEDING 60,000. EVEN WITH A DOUBLING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET, CANADA COULD NOT RECAPITALIZE ITS EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE FOR PERHAPS 15 YEARS, AND NO ONE PREDICTS THOSE SORT OF FUNDING LEVELS (UNLESS PERHAPS IN THE UNFORTUNATE EVENT CANADA WERE TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR 9-11 TYPE ATTACK). GIVING UP ON MAJOR MISSION AREAS, SUCH AS AN OPERATIONAL BLUE WATER NAVY (AND MOVING TO SUPPORT/TRANSPORT AND 200 MILE SECURITY MISSIONS), IS THE ONLY WAY CANADA CAN FULLY FUND AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING (OR FORECAST) BUDGETS. THE CURRENT DND LEADERSHIP IS VERY NAVY-HEAVY, SO THIS IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. CANADA SEEMS DESTINED TO HOBBLE ALONG WITH ONE OF THE SMALLEST MILITARIES IN THE WORLD TO FIELD A COMPLETE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS CANADIAN FORCES AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED SO LONG THERE IS NO WAY WITHIN THE CURRENT CANADIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT AND WITH COMPETING BUDGETARY PRESSURES FOR THEM TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS CAPABILITIES. IF THE CURRENT TREND OF SALAMI-SLICING THE BUDGET CONTINUES, IT WILL RESULT IN THE CANADIAN FORCES BECOMING MORE AND MORE A DOMESTIC, CONTINENTAL/HOMELAND DEFENSE FORCES. THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE WHICH JUST 15 YEARS AGO HAD TWO ROBUST BASES IN GERMANY CAN NO LONGER DEPLOY MORE THAN FOUR TO SIX CF-18S AND WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY REPEATING ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE BALKANS. WITH LESS THAN 100 ACTIVE FIGHTER PILOTS AND AN INVENTORY FALLING TO 50 AVAILABLE FIGHTERS, THE NORAD MISSION IS ABOUT ALL THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE CAN HANDLE. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ARE IN EVEN WORSE SHAPE AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER TEN YEARS, CANADA DOES NOT HAVE A FRIGATE FLOATING WITH A U.S. CARRIER GROUP. EXPECT THE CANADIAN FORCES TO BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN MORE THAN 2,000 SOLDIERS DEPLOYED WORLDWIDE EVEN AFTER FEB 2006.

17. (U) CURRENT MILITARY RELATED ISSUES:

1A. (U) HOMELAND DEFENSE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS INAUGURATION, THE PM CREATED A NEW MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC), AN INSTITUTION ANALOGOUS TO THE U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. THE AGENCY'S GOAL IS TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND COORDINATE EMERGENCY RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE LINES OF AUTHORITY OF THIS MINISTRY ARE STILL BEING DRAWN AND THEY ARE MORE FOCUSED ON INTERNAL ORGANIZATION THAN STANDING UP A WORKING ORGANIZATION, IT ALREADY HAS ESTABLISHED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH COUNTERPART USG AGENCIES, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE SAME SENSE OF URGENCY.

1B. (U) MARITIME SECURITY. ALTHOUGH THIS IS SLOWLY CHANGING, CANADA'S MARITIME SECURITY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED IN AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION BETWEEN A PLETHORA OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. IN TERMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP) IS THE ONLY NATIONAL AGENCY WITH A DAY-TO-DAY, LEGISLATED MANDATE TO POLICE ALL TERRITORIAL CANADIAN WATERS. IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES (NAVY) CAN AND HAVE BEEN GIVEN LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS IF SPECIAL AUTHORITY IS GRANTED BY GOVERNMENT. THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS A SUB-AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS (DFO), IS TASKED WITH A COLLECTION OF MARINE PROGRAMS AND SERVICE MISSIONS, AND DOES NOT FULFILL A LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION. BOTH THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD AND NAVY USUALLY PROVIDE THE PLATFORMS FOR RCMP AGENTS TO CONDUCT LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS OFF THE CANADIAN COAST. SINCE THE INCEPTION OF CANADA'S FIRST EVER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN APRIL 2004, COLLECTIVELY THE NAVY, COAST GUARD, RCMP AND

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE BEEN WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO MEET THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY OF CANADIAN WATERS. CANADA WITH THE WORLD'S LONGEST COASTLINE MEASURING ALMOST 150 MILLION MILES IS WOEFULLY UNDER RESOURCED WHEN IT COMES TO NUMBERS OF MARITIME VESSELS AND APPROPRIATING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET DOLLARS. THE FIELDING (AND EVEN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS) OF FOUR USED SUBMARINES RECENTLY PURCHASED FROM THE UK IS BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION IN THE WAKE OF AN ACCIDENT (FIRE AT SEA) DURING THE MAIDEN VOYAGE TRANSIT TO CANADA OF ONE OF THE SUBS THAT CLAIMED THE LIFE OF A CANADIAN NAVAL OFFICER. A RECENT STUDY BY CANADA'S SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE CONCLUDED, "THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO END THE FRAGMENTED AND LARGELY AD HOC DEFENSE OF CANADA'S COASTLINE".

1C. (C/NF) MISSILE DEFENSE. ON 5 AUG 04, CANADA ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD AGREED TO AMEND THE NORAD AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE THE MISSILE DEFENSE THREAT WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT MISSION WITHIN NORAD. THE MARTIN GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO KEEP THIS DECISION SEPARATE FROM MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM, A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN CANADA, WHERE SOME OPPOSITION PARTIES EQUATE MISSILE DEFENSE WITH WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF POLITICAL HAND-WRINGING IN THE WAKE OF PRESIDENT BUSH BRINGING UP MISSILE DEFENSE DURING HIS 30 NOV-1 DEC 04 VISIT. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN RHETORIC FROM MARTIN WHICH DOWNPLAYED CANADIAN PARTICIPATION MISSILE DEFENSE, THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT THE ISSUE WILL LIKELY BE FAVORABLY TABLED EARLY IN THE NEW PARLIAMENTARY SESSION THIS SPRING.

1D. (C/RELCAN) NORAD RENEWAL/TRANSFORMATION. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEGUN FOR THE 2006 RENEWAL OF THE NORAD AGREEMENT. THERE IS AN APPETITE AMONG SOME, NORAD/NORTHCOM IN PARTICULAR ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO TRANSFORM NORAD INTO A MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND, IN LIEU OF ITS CURRENT AEROSPACE CHARTER. MANY ENVISION NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSE COMMAND WITH USNORTHCOM AS ITS U.S. COMPONENT. THE BINATIONAL PLANNING GROUP HAS BEEN STUDYING NEW MISSION AREAS INCLUDING MARITIME SURVEILLANCE/DOMAIN AWARENESS, CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA), CROSS-BORDER CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, AND THE ADDITION OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION. WHILE U.S. AND NORAD STAFFS ARE READY TO PROCEED WITH INCORPORATION OF THESE MISSIONS/TASKS. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT GIVEN THE MANDATE TO NEGOTIATING ENTITIES. HOW FAR AND HOW FAST NORAD TRANSFORMS WILL BE DETERMINED DURING NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE COMING MONTHS, BUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO NORAD ARE CERTAINLY NOT ASSURED, GIVEN THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN OTTAWA.

1E. (C) NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY THAT - WHEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED - WOULD INTEGRATE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO ENHANCE AND ENSURE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CANADIANS AND THEIR ALLIES AND CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THE PROPOSED 690 MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS (520 MILLION USD) INITIATIVE WILL FOCUS IN SIX KEY AREAS - INTELLIGENCE, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH, TRANSPORTATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. PREVENTING ATTACKS UPON ALLIES (READ U.S.) FROM CANADIAN SOIL AND ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY ARE TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES. THE NEW CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IS AVAILABLE AT WWW/PCO-BCP.GC.CA. SEARCH ON 'NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY'.

1F. (C) DEFENSE REVIEW. CANADA IS CONDUCTING BOTH INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE REVIEWS WHICH WERE EXPECTED BEFORE THE END OF CY2004. DEFENSE MINISTER GRAHAM SAID TODAY THAT INFIGHTING BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS CANADA, DND, AND THE CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCY WILL LIKELY CAUSE A DELAY IN THE RELEASE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY REVIEW UNTIL AT LEAST THE END OF JANUARY 2005, AND THE DEFENCE REVIEW WILL FOLLOW THAT. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN A FORMAL DEFENSE REVIEW SINCE THE 1994 WHITE PAPER, GRAHAM HAS NIXED A FORMAL REVIEW IN FAVOR OF AN INTERNALLY-STAFFED REVIEW (BY THE SAME ASST DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER FOR POLICY WHO AUTHORED THE 1994 REVIEW) DR KEN CALDER). SOME BELIEVE THIS DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW IS SHAPING UP TO BE A WATERED DOWN DOCUMENT WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGES OR NEW INVESTMENTS FOR THE FY05 BUDGET (APRIL 2005). EXPECTED CHANGES INCLUDE: MORE ROBUST MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY CAPABILITIES; IMPROVED C4ISR; STRATEGIC SEA AND AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS; MORE SPECIAL FORCES; SOLDIER C3, MOBILITY EQUIPMENT, AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS MORE INTEROPERABLE WITH U.S. FORCES; AND A DRAMATIC DOWN-SIZING OF TANKS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY PLATFORMS.

18. (U) RECOMMENDED THEMES AND TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TALKS WITH DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICIALS:

1A. (U) WE NEED TO BRING MORE DOMAINS CRITICAL TO HOMELAND DEFENSE INTO A NORAD-LIKE STRUCTURE. IT IS TIME TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE FINE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL PLANNING GROUP (BPG) IN COLORADO SPRINGS. I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT WE NEED TO ENHANCE OUR COOPERATION ON MARITIME DOMAIN

AWARENESS AND MARITIME SECURITY.

1B. (U) WHAT OTHER DOMAINS DOES CANADA ENVISION AS APPROPRIATE FOR A TRANSFORMED NORAD? CYBER SECURITY? MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES? CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT?

1C. (U) WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO BE THE MAJOR THEMES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY REVIEW BEYOND CODIFYING YOUR 3D APPROACH) DIPLOMACY, DEFENSE, AND DEVELOPMENT?

1D. (U) WHAT DO YOU EXPECT WILL BE THE KEY FINDINGS OF YOUR DEFENCE REVIEW IN THE AREAS OF HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CONTINENTAL DEFENSE/SECURITY?

1E. (U) AS A RESULT OF THE TWO REVIEWS, WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT TO SEE MORE OF FROM CANADA IN THE COMING YEARS? SPECIAL FORCES) TIER 1 OR TIER 2? STRATEGIC AIRLIFT? COASTAL AND INLAND WATERWAY PATROLCRAFT? ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE? UAV,S?

1F. (U) AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSE REVIEW ARE THERE MISSION AREAS AND COMPETENCIES YOU EXPECT TO MOVE OUT OF OR DEEMPHASIZE (BEYOND HEAVY ARMOR)?

1G. (U) THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE HAS A KEY ROLE IN OUR STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. HAPPY TO SEE CANADA HAS A NEW AND ACTIVE CHAIR (JUDI LONGFIELD). WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE RESULTS OF THE PJBD MEETING IN MARCH 2005.

1H. (U) AS PSEPC MOVES FORWARD IN ITS INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS PLEASE CONSIDER ASD-HD AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN BENCHMARKING ALONG OTHER U.S. AGENCIES SUCH AS DHS. WE ARE ALL IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING HOW TO FUSE THE RIGHT CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION. ONE PLACE PSEPC LEADERS SHOULD DEFINITELY VISIT IS NORTHCOM AND THEIR INTERAGENCY COORDINATING GROUP. ANOTHER IS JTF-CIVIL SUPPORT WHERE THEIR PLANNERS ARE DOING GREAT WORK IN DOCUMENTING BOTH CRITICAL AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE IN CASE OF A CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT EVENT.

19. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS COL DAVE BRACKETT, DEFENSE ATTACHE, USDAO OTTAWA. UNCLAS 613-688-5400; STU-III 613-688-3123. SIPRNET: DIBRADS(AT)NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL.

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